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Exponential's security posture at a glance

For public bodies assessing Exponential - the project's own status against the OWASP Top 10, OWASP ASVS, Content Security Policy, the OWASP cheat sheets and coordinated disclosure, what is on by default, what is off by…

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Address: https://doc.exponential.earth/exphelp/viewer/help/government/security/security-posture-at-a-glance.md

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Exponential's security posture at a glance

This page is for project managers, information security officers and administrators in public bodies who need a one-page view of Exponential's security before reading the detail. Every status comes from the project's own statement, Security standards; the words "Partly complies", "Unverified" and "Complies" are kept as written there. The project makes no claim of an external assessment.

Warning

.htaccess slows down every request. When .htaccess files are enabled (AllowOverride anything but None), let alone used, Apache looks for them and reads and evaluates them on every request, in every directory of the path, and page loading times go up drastically (measured). The only real fix is to switch the feature off for the virtual host: AllowOverride None in the HTTPS virtual host, and the rules in the virtual host's own configuration as mod_rewrite rules. That is far faster in production speed tests and well worth the time it takes to optimize a production configuration. Switch over right away: copy the rules of the example HTTPS virtual host into your virtual host (with the static cache, also staticcache_offload.conf), set AllowOverride None, run apachectl configtest, reload Apache and test the site. The same rules for other servers: nginx, LiteSpeed, Caddy, IIS, Velocity (built in); where virtual host rules go in a control panel: Plesk, cPanel, DirectAdmin, ISPConfig. On LiteSpeed or OpenLiteSpeed, the server's own page cache can also answer anonymous visitors and crawlers without PHP: Page caching with LiteSpeed and OpenLiteSpeed.

Contents

  1. Status by standard
  2. On by default
  3. Off by default: your decisions
  4. Known gaps
  5. Related pages

Status by standard

StandardStatusIn one line
OWASP Top 10 (2021)Partly compliesmitigations in all ten categories; A09 Logging and monitoring is rated Complies
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3Unverifiedno assessment; level 1 needs MinPasswordLength raised to 12
Content Security Policy Level 3Partly compliesreport-only on the administration by default, off on public sites
OWASP Cheat Sheet SeriesPartly compliesCSRF tokens, password storage, session cookies, headers, escaping, uploads
Coordinated vulnerability disclosurePartly compliesSECURITY.md with a private channel; no security.txt shipped

"Complies" would need an external assessment, which has not been made (Security standards: Status).

On by default

DefenseSource
Security headers on every page (nosniff, SAMEORIGIN, frame-ancestors 'self', Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)site.ini [HTTPHeaderSettings] SecurityHeaders[]
Session cookie HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure over HTTPSsite.ini [Session]
Passwords hashed with password_hash() (bcrypt), old hashes upgraded at sign-in[UserSettings] HashType=php_default, UpdateHash=true
Well-known and common passwords refusedWeakPasswordCheck=enabled
Other sessions signed out after a password change[PasswordSettings] EndOtherSessions=enabled
CSRF form tokens on every formextension ezformtoken, activated by the setup wizard
Tamper-evident audit trail with alert rulesaudit.ini [AuditSettings] Audit=enabled
Request classifier writing probes and attacks to security.logrequestclassifier.ini
Setup wizard closed on an installed siteexpSetupWizardGuard
No PHP executed below the document root; dot files refused.htaccess_root
Debug output off[DebugSettings] DebugOutput=disabled
Secrets in config.php masked in console output and diffs; every edit backed up to a 0700 directoryexp:config:*, exp:setup:* (from the console)

Off by default: your decisions

SettingShippedWhy it is offPage
Account lockoutMaxNumberOfFailedLogin=0a lockout also lets anyone lock a known accountAccount lockout
Two-step sign-in requiredEnforce2FA=disabledneeds enrolment of every userTwo-step sign-in
CSP enforcedMode=auto (report-only on admin)extensions and designs must be checked firstContent Security Policy
HSTSemptymust only be set once every name is HTTPS-onlyHTTPS and HSTS
Minimum password length 12 or more10a policy decisionPassword policy
Configuration lockedManagedByDeployment=disabledonly where settings come from version controlConfiguration managed by the deployment
Deactivate and move for leaversDeactivateAndMove=disabledopt-in featureRoles and least privilege

Known gaps

From Security standards: Known gaps:

  • lockout off by default; brute force is detected by alert rules, not throttled by the kernel;
  • two-step sign-in is opt-in;
  • no prepared statements in the database layer (values are escaped);
  • output escaping in templates is not automatic (|wash must be applied);
  • older password hash types still readable for migrated accounts until they sign in;
  • no dependency vulnerability scan in CI;
  • HSTS empty by default.

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Documentation license

This documentation is free documentation, licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License 1.3 or later.

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